Transparency · updated monthly
Warrant canary.
A signed, time-bound statement designed to make silence visible. The plaintext below is the canonical source.
Current statement
Current and signed
A PGP signature is attached and the statement is inside its validity window.
889D A7D2 DCFB 4F60 6B41 7D06 80E3 18D8 60BD 9FCD
46b842ca808eff9092e7c70cf92ad3d0c771af732c2d2c5530938f314d44bde7
PGP signature
Attached
Public key
Published
Published
Oct 21, 2026
Renew by
Nov 25, 2026
What the operator attests
These claims are trustworthy only after independent signature verification.
leak.fun has not received a National Security Letter, secret court order, or other classified demand for user information.
leak.fun has not received an order requiring the operator to weaken, backdoor, or otherwise compromise the service.
leak.fun is not subject to a gag order that prevents disclosure of a request for user information.
leak.fun has not knowingly provided bulk access to user data or cryptographic key material to a government or law-enforcement agency.
No leak.fun canary signing key has been seized or compromised to the operator's knowledge.
Canonical statement
This is the exact content served at /canary.txt.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 leak.fun Warrant Canary Version: 1 Status: ACTIVE Statement-ID: 2026-10 Published-At: 2026-10-21T23:54:46.783Z Valid-Until: 2026-11-25T23:54:46.783Z PGP-Fingerprint: 889D A7D2 DCFB 4F60 6B41 7D06 80E3 18D8 60BD 9FCD Public-Key-URL: https://leak.fun/canary-key.asc Previous-Statement-SHA256: cd5106acb1f216bfe4e37ddc08423a78f0519a44701051f5bd1ee93d2eb1d9f2 Freshness-Proof: Bitcoin latest block hash: 000000000000000000013ab9cdb316074188b7cb2ba6bf04b9488461bc5e2ba7; Ethereum latest block hash: 0xcbeda3e132770b53f9aed58a7226978a456800d320a415bb3830de49e557a12e Bitcoin-Block-Hash: 000000000000000000013ab9cdb316074188b7cb2ba6bf04b9488461bc5e2ba7 Ethereum-Block-Hash: 0xcbeda3e132770b53f9aed58a7226978a456800d320a415bb3830de49e557a12e The leak.fun operator affirms the following statements as of the Published-At timestamp above. Statements: 1. leak.fun has not received a National Security Letter, secret court order, or other classified demand for user information. 2. leak.fun has not received an order requiring the operator to weaken, backdoor, or otherwise compromise the service. 3. leak.fun is not subject to a gag order that prevents disclosure of a request for user information. 4. leak.fun has not knowingly provided bulk access to user data or cryptographic key material to a government or law-enforcement agency. 5. No leak.fun canary signing key has been seized or compromised to the operator's knowledge. Continuity: The Previous-Statement-SHA256 field links each signed statement to the complete bytes of the statement that preceded it. A missing, late, invalid, or broken-chain statement should be investigated, but is not by itself proof that any event described above has occurred. Scope: These statements are made only to the operator's knowledge as of the Published-At timestamp. They are a transparency signal, not legal advice or an absolute guarantee. End-of-statement: leak.fun warrant canary version 1 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iJEEARYKADkWIQSInafS3PtPYGtBfQaA4xjYYL2fzQUCatlQzhsUgAAAAAAEAA5t YW51MiwyLjUrMS4xMiwyLDEACgkQgOMY2GC9n820DQEA62i++DjhgxYui+pWQ0DZ vDwtPK84vYv+O1T1KThH3kgA/31VDMdCIyUUG8Xa7EwYKPxkdhtQ0o3LpuPMqyU+ bm8B =/ZYl -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Freshness proof
Recent Bitcoin and Ethereum block hashes make silent backdating harder.
- Bitcoin block hash
- 000000000000000000013ab9cdb316074188b7cb2ba6bf04b9488461bc5e2ba7
- Ethereum block hash
- 0xcbeda3e132770b53f9aed58a7226978a456800d320a415bb3830de49e557a12e
How to interpret a change
A missing, late, invalid, or broken-chain statement is a signal to investigate. It is not, by itself, proof that a secret demand or compromise occurred.
Verify independently
Do not trust the visual badge alone. Verify the file and compare the fingerprint.
- 1
Download the plaintext statement and the public key.
- 2
Import the public key into a local GPG keyring.
- 3
Verify the clear-signed statement with GPG.
- 4
Compare the reported fingerprint with the one shown here and in a second trusted channel.
gpg --verify canary.txtStatement archive
Previous statements remain available so the monthly hash chain can be audited.